seems unaware of the circuit split. 17 Notwithstanding the lack of meaningful attention from legal scholars, as these cases become more common, the more likely the Supreme Court is to grant certiorari on this issue. The resolution to the circuit split offered in this Article provides a suggested approach for the Court when it confronts this issue and for lower courts until the Supreme Court resolves the circuit split. 18 This Article proceeds in three parts.
Part I sets out the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine, beginning with the adoption of the Declaratory Judgment Act and continuing through the Supreme Court's decisions in Brillhart in 1942 and in Wilton over half a century later. Part II then presents the circuit split that has developed over what abstention rules apply to mixed complaints. Finally, Part III explains why the heart of the complaint rule is the best approach.
I. THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT AND THE BRILLHART/WILTON DOCTRINE
This Part sets the foundation for examining how the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine applies to mixed complaints. It first discusses the Declaratory Judgment Act, describing its adoption and its language before then examining in depth Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co., the circuit split that developed after the Court decided Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 19 and the Supreme Court's resolution of that circuit split in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.
A. The Declaratory Judgment Act
As early as 1918, scholars such as Professor Edwin Borchard at Yale Law School advocated for the adoption of declaratory judgments as a potential remedy "to afford security and relief against uncertainty and for Mixed Relief, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 347 (2014) . As discussed later in this Article, the proposal in that article does not offer the best solution to the circuit split.
17. See, e.g., Mathew D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal Court Intervention, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1102, 1152 (1998) (stating simply that Brillhart/Wilton was inapplicable because the plaintiff in a case also sought declaratory relief, with no recognition that federal courts of appeal are sharply divided on this issue).
18. This Article does not attempt to survey all cases in which these various approaches have been applied. Indeed, I have no need to do so, as that task has already been aptly accomplished. doubt." 20 The American Bar Association called a bill proposed in Congress that would introduce declaratory judgments into the federal courts " [t] he most important legislation of the year affecting the administration of justice." 21 Although other legal systems had a remedy similar to a declaratory judgment, 22 Congress did not move quickly to adopt the declaratory judgment, 23 even after the American Bar Association and the National Conference Commissioners on Uniform State Laws published the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act in 1922. 24 Congress held hearings during the 1920s on bills that would have allowed federal courts to grant declaratory judgments, but none of these hearings resulted in the passage of a bill permitting federal courts to grant such relief. 25 Moreover, while Congress was debating these bills, the Supreme Court decided three cases that cast doubt on the constitutionality of declaratory judgments. 26 In 1933, however, the Supreme Court reversed course in Nashville, 25. See Dolak, supra note 23, at 408 n.6 (providing citations to examples of the statements from various hearings during the 1920s). One of the more colorful descriptions of the need for declaratory judgments came from Representative Ralph Waldo Emerson Gilbert of Kentucky, who said, "Under the present law you take a step in the dark and then turn on the light to see if you stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory law you turn on the light and then take the step." 69 CONG. REC. 2030 (1928) (remarks of Rep. Gilbert).
26. See Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274, 289 (1928) (observing that a declaratory judgment claim "is not a case or controversy within the meaning of article 3 of the Constitution"); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Mktg. Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71, 89 (1928) ("This court has no jurisdiction to review a mere declaratory judgment."); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 76 (1927) (holding that a state declaratory judgment law "neither purports to nor can extend the jurisdiction of the district courts beyond the constitutional limitations"); see also Doernberg & Mushlin, supra note 22, at 558-61 (discussing these decisions).
Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway v. Wallace
27 and upheld Tennessee's declaratory judgment law, explaining that "the Constitution does not require that the case or controversy should be presented by traditional forms of procedure, invoking only traditional remedies. The judiciary clause of the Constitution defined and limited judicial power, not the particular method by which that power might be invoked." 28 With that decision, the Court "cleared the way for passage of the federal [Declaratory Judgment] Act." 29 Congress moved quickly after Wallace and passed the Declaratory Judgment Act 30 in 1934. The Act provides, in relevant part,
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.
31
A few years later in 1937, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act, observing that the Act limited declaratory judgments to cases in which a case or controversy existed under Article III 32 and did not expand federal jurisdiction beyond that constitutional limit. 33 Two years later, Central had issued a liability policy to Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., and then later that year in October, a truck driven by a Cooper-Jarrett employee caused an accident that resulted in the death of Brillhart's decedent. 35 Brillhart sued in state court in Missouri, and Cooper-Jarrett sought to have Central defend the case. 36 Central refused, however, claiming that the accident was not covered under the policy, so Cooper-Jarrett hired its own attorney.
37
During the litigation in the Missouri court, both Central and CooperJarrett experienced major financial problems. Central became insolvent and was liquidated by an Illinois court, which entered an order prohibiting any claimant from prosecuting a claim against Central.
38
After Central went into this receivership, Cooper-Jarrett filed for bankruptcy. 39 The court overseeing the bankruptcy allowed Brillhart to withdraw his claims in the bankruptcy action and pursue his lawsuit against Cooper-Jarrett, on the ground that Cooper-Jarrett had insurance.
40
As Brillhart pursued his claim, Cooper-Jarrett's attorney withdrew, and the company never hired another lawyer to represent it, ultimately resulting in a default judgment of $20,000 against it. 41 Based on this Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950))). Despite this "procedural only" view of the Act, some scholars have argued that Congress actually did intend to expand federal jurisdiction and that the Court has actually permitted jurisdiction to be expanded under the Act. Excess, before it was ever sued in state court, filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court in Kansas, seeking a declaration that it was not liable for the judgment against Central because Central had failed to notify Excess of the pending litigation, as the reinsurance agreement required Central to do. 44 The district court dismissed the case "because of a reluctance to prolong the litigation." 45 The Tenth Circuit reversed. Although noting that courts have "some discretionary power" over whether to hear cases "[w]here a prior action has been filed in a court of concurrent jurisdiction between the same parties and involving the same issues," the district court had no such authority to dismiss this case. 46 The circuit court noted that this case "was squarely within the purview" of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which was designed "to afford one who is threatened with liability an early opportunity to determine his rights by forcing his adversary to come into court and assert his claim, without waiting until it pleased [the adversary] to institute an action to recover." 47 Here, Excess was not a party to the garnishment proceeding, the only pending state court action. 48 The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to decide Excess's claim on the merits. 49 Brillhart appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 50 In Judgment Act.
51
The Court explained that when a plaintiff files a declaratory judgment action, a district court is "under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction" granted by the Act.
52
That "another proceeding was pending in a state court in which all the matters in controversy between the parties could [have] be[en] fully adjudicated" was "relevant" to determining whether a district court should exercise jurisdiction over the claim for declaratory relief because " [o] rdinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties." 53 Based on this rationale, the Court instructed that in instances such as this case, district courts "should ascertain whether the questions in controversy between the parties to the federal suit, and which are not foreclosed under the applicable substantive law, can better be settled in the proceeding pending in the state court." 54 In conducting this inquiry, district courts should consider the scope of the pending state court proceeding and the nature of defenses open there [,] . . . . whether the claims of all parties in interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary parties have been joined, [and] whether such parties are amenable to process in that proceeding . . . .
55
District courts should also consider any other factors that may be relevant to whether they should exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action.
56
Applying this standard, the Court held that the district court abused its discretion because the district court did not consider whether Excess's claims were foreclosed under Missouri law or could be considered by the state court in the garnishment proceeding. 57 Rather than "attempt[ing] to pronounce independently upon Missouri law," the Court remanded the case to the district court to consider these issues in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction.
58
The standard that the Court adopted in Brillhart provides "[district] courts great freedom in deciding whether to entertain declaratory judgment actions." 59 By not limiting the relevant factors that district courts can consider when determining whether to exercise jurisdiction, the Court recognized that district judges have their "boots on the ground" to examine carefully the facts of each case.
60
This broad discretion permitted by Brillhart allows district courts to make their decisions on a case-by-case basis, giving them a necessary degree of flexibility to reach a just result in each case. 61 80. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2012) ("Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit.").
81. Here, the Court held that the district court properly dismissed the suit because the McCarran Amendment reflected the desire to have waterrights issues decided in a single proceeding, the lack of substantial proceedings in the district court, and the involvement of so many statelaw water rights with 1,000 defendants. Group, informed London Underwriters of the pending litigation and sought coverage under commercial liability policies, but London Underwriters refused to defend or indemnify the Hill Group. 100 That litigation resulted in a verdict in excess of $100 million against the Hill Group, and the Hill Group informed London Underwriters of the verdict.
101
London Underwriters sought a declaratory judgment in federal court that it was not liable under the policy. 102 After negotiations, London Underwriters dismissed the case, but the Hill Group agreed to give two weeks' notice if it intended to sue on the policy. 103 The Hill Group gave notice of its intent to sue on February 23, 1993, and the next day, London Underwriters filed its declaratory judgment claim in federal court.
104 About a month later, the Hill Group filed its suit in state court in Texas and moved to dismiss or stay the declaratory judgment action in federal court. 105 The district court stayed the action, reasoning "that the state lawsuit pending in [Texas state court] encompassed the same coverage issues raised in the declaratory judgment action" and finding "that a stay was warranted in order to avoid piecemeal litigation and to bar London Underwriters' attempts at forum shopping." concepts of discretion surface." 110 Thus, the Declaratory Judgment Act is "an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant,"
111 and "the normal principle that federal courts should adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction yields to considerations of practicality and wise judicial administration."
112
The Supreme Court therefore clarified that in the context of declaratory judgments, district courts continued to possess broad discretion in deciding whether to grant relief. 113 No longer would Colorado River and subsequent cases cause any confusion about the standard for declining to hear claims for declaratory relief. Only for claims seeking nondeclaratory relief had the Court imposed a much more restrictive standard in Colorado River, permitting a district court to decline to hear a case only in exceptional circumstances.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER MIXED COMPLAINTS
Despite Wilton's clarification about the standard for district courts not to decide declaratory judgment claims, that decision left open some issues about the standard for not deciding claims involving declaratory relief. Although the Supreme Court has articulated a clear standard for complaints that sought exclusively one type of relief-either declaratory or nondeclaratory-the Court has never given such guidance for mixed complaints. Unsurprisingly, a circuit split has subsequently developed on this question.
This circuit split includes four distinct approaches. The first approach is that the court never applies the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine to mixed claims. The second approach is that the court must determine if the claims for nondeclaratory relief are jurisdictionally independent from the claims for declaratory relief, and if so, apply the Colorado River doctrine. The third approach is that the court looks to the "heart of the 110. Id. at 287. 111. Id. (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241 (1952)); see also Pub. Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962) ("The Declaratory Judgment Act was an authorization, not a command. It gave the federal courts competence to make a declaration of rights; it did not impose a duty to do so.").
112. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288; see also id. ("By the Declaratory Judgment Act, Congress sought to place a remedial arrow in the district court's quiver; it created an opportunity, rather than a duty, to grant a new form of relief to qualifying litigants."). The Court did note that in most cases, "a stay [rather than a dismissal] will often be the preferable course, because it assures that the federal action can proceed without risk of a time bar if the state case, for any reason, fails to resolve the matter in controversy." Id. at 290 n.2.
113. For discussion and analysis of Wilton, see generally Giesel, supra note 599.
complaint" and applies the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine if the essence of the complaint seeks declaratory relief. The final approach is that the court separates the claims for declaratory and nondeclaratory relief and applies the appropriate standard to each type of claim.
A. The First Approach: Brillhart/Wilton Never Applies
Four circuits-the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth-have adopted this approach. These courts have adopted this bright-line, categorical rule that prohibits district courts from applying the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine if a complaint includes any claims that seek nondeclaratory relief.
The Fifth Circuit was an early adopter of this view, doing so in 1994 in Southwind Aviation, Inc. v. Bergen Aviation, Inc.
114
In that case, Southwind contracted with Bergen to repair an aircraft.
115
After the repairs took longer and cost more than initially anticipated, Bergan filed suit against Southwind in Texas state court, and Southwind later filed suit in federal court.
116
Southwind sought declaratory relief and monetary damages from Bergan. 117 The district court construed the case as one seeking declaratory relief, and it applied the more lenient Brillhart standard rather than the stricter Colorado River test.
118
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court's analysis. After noting the difference in Brillhart and Colorado River, the court of appeals recognized that the case involved nondeclaratory relief claims in addition to the ones for declaratory relief. which the circuit court held was the proper standard for determining whether to abstain from deciding this mixed-complaint case.
121
The Fifth Circuit has been so firm in this rule that it has applied the rule even when a party initially filed only claims for declaratory relief and did not add claims for nondeclaratory relief until after the opposing party moved to abstain. In Kelly Investment, Inc. v. Continental Common Corp., 122 Continental Common had sued Kelly Investment 123 in Texas state court, alleging a breach of promissory notes. 124 While this litigation was ongoing, Kelly Investment sought multiple declaratory judgments relating to the promissory notes in Louisiana state court, which Continental Common removed to federal district court. 125 After the case was removed and Continental Common moved to abstain, Kelly Investment added claims for monetary relief as well. 126 The district court applied the Colorado River doctrine, despite the fact that Kelly Investment added its claims for money damages after Continental Common filed its motion to abstain.
127
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Colorado River test applied and that, on these facts, that test was not met. 128 Specifically, as for the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine, the court observed that "Brillhart is only applicable 'when a district court is considering abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action.' In contrast, when an action contains any claim for coercive relief, the Colorado River abstention doctrine is ordinarily applicable." rule may not be quite as bright as it might first appear, and now the Fifth Circuit recognizes these two exceptions-that the claims for nondeclaratory relief were frivolous or added for the purpose of defeating application of the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine-as the "only" exceptions to its bright-line rule.
131
The Second Circuit adopted this view in its 1999 decision in Village of Westfield v. Welch's. 132 In this case, the Village of Westfield had built a new wastewater treatment facility, and it charged Welch's certain user fees based on Welch's grape-processing plant in the village. 133 Welch's sued the village in New York state court in 1984, alleging that the village had overcharged Welch's for fees, and then the next year, Welch's filed a second suit, which was consolidated with the first suit, based on the village's changes to the user fees. 134 This state court litigation continued for more than a decade, during which time the state court reversed itself on multiple occasions. 135 In 1997-thirteen years after Welch's first filed suit-the village filed its own suit in state court, seeking fees from the previous two years from Welch's. 136 Welch's removed the case to federal court and asserted counterclaims for a declaration of its rights and damages from the village.
137
The district court granted the village's motion to stay the case based on the state court litigation.
138
The Second Circuit ultimately reversed the district court. which are subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. 158 Meanwhile, some of Lawrence's supporters had previously sued vonRosenberg in state court on claims arising from the same dispute.
159 Lawrence moved to stay the case in federal court, and the district court granted the stay under Brillhart/Wilton. 160 The Fourth Circuit vacated that order and remanded the case, holding that the district court should have applied Colorado River. 161 The court of appeals reasoned that applying Brillhart/Wilton to mixed complaints "would ignore the very different justifications for the two abstention standards" and that Brillhart/Wilton "provides a poor fit for causes of action over which a federal court generally must exercise jurisdiction." 162 Stating that it "join[ed]" the position adopted by the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, the court held that adopting another rule "would deprive a plaintiff of access to a federal forum simply because he sought declaratory relief in addition to an injunction or money damages." ("Such a penalty for requesting a declaration seems especially unwarranted given that nearly all claims, including those for damages or injunctive relief, effectively ask a court to declare the rights of the parties to the suit. To ensure that they have asked for all available relief, plaintiffs commonly add a request for declaratory relief in addition to requests for equitable or monetary relief. We decline to adopt a rule that would transform that thoroughness into a handicap.").
Several This second approach, adopted by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, takes a more nuanced approach than the bright-line rule discussed in Section A. Courts adhering to this approach consider the particular claims in a mixed complaint, determining if the claims for nondeclaratory relief are jurisdictionally independent of the claims for declaratory relief.
If the claims for nondeclaratory relief are independent, then the court will not apply the Brillhart/Wilton standard; on the other hand, if those claims are not independent, then the court will apply this more lenient standard.
The Ninth Circuit is credited with first adopting this approach.
164
Faced with another appeal in "a seemingly never-ending bout of litigation," 165 the court of appeals acknowledged that its jurisprudence "concerning the scope of the district court's discretion to decline jurisdiction over declaratory claims joined with other causes of action [had] been less than crystal clear." 166 The court noted that in some cases it had "applied the principle that 'when other claims are joined with an action for declaratory relief (e.g., bad faith, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, rescission, or claims for other monetary relief), the district court should not, as a general rule, remand or decline to entertain the claim for declaratory relief.'" 167 The court noted that in other cases, however, it had "concluded that the presence of claims for monetary relief did not require the district court to accept jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act." 168 The court clarified that in mixed-complaint cases [t] he appropriate inquiry for a district court in a Declaratory Judgment Act case is to determine whether there are claims in the case that exist independent of any request for purely declaratory relief, that is, claims Cir. 1983 that would continue to exist if the request for a declaration simply dropped from the case. 169 Describing this test in more detail, the court wrote:
The proper analysis, then, must be whether the claim for monetary relief is independent in the sense that it could be litigated in federal court even if no declaratory claim had been filed. In other words, the district court should consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the monetary claim alone, and if so, whether that claim must be joined with one for declaratory relief. 170 The Seventh Circuit undertook a detailed analysis of this approach in R.R. Street & Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 171 a case that provides a useful case study of this approach in practice. There, Vulcan entered into an agreement with R.R. Street that made R.R. Street the exclusive distributor of a Vulcan product and required Vulcan to defend and indemnify R.R. Street for all claims brought against R.R. Street based on that company's distribution of Vulcan's product. 172 Vulcan refused to defend R.R. Street in several lawsuits filed based on harms from the product R.R. Street was distributing.
173 National Union Fire Insurance Company-an insurer that had policies with Vulcan-had been defending R.R. Street in these lawsuits based on a separate policy that National Union had with R.R. Street.
174 R.R. Street and National Union filed suit against Vulcan in the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaration that Vulcan was obligated to defend and indemnify R.R. Street and bringing claims for breach of contract, common-law indemnity, and promissory estoppel, for which the plaintiffs sought money damages.
175
The district court determined that the Wilton/Brillhart doctrine applied to the entire case because "the plaintiffs' claims for damages were dependent upon their claim for declaratory relief," concluding that the case should be dismissed.
176
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with this conclusion. After noting the 169 various positions taken by other circuit courts, 177 the Seventh Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's position. 178 The court reasoned that this position, although perhaps not as easy to apply as the bright-line approach of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, preserved the "unique and substantial discretion" that district courts enjoy over whether to hear claims for declaratory relief. 179 The court articulated this approach in the following test:
Where state and federal proceedings are parallel and the federal suit contains claims for both declaratory and non-declaratory relief, the district court should determine whether the claims seeking nondeclaratory relief are independent of the declaratory claim. If they are not, the court can exercise its discretion under Wilton/Brillhart and abstain from hearing the entire action.
But if they are, the Wilton/Brillhart doctrine does not apply and, subject to the presence of exceptional circumstances under the Colorado River doctrine, the court must hear the independent non-declaratory claims. The district court then should retain the declaratory claim under Wilton/Brillhart (along with any dependent non-declaratory claims) in order to avoid piecemeal litigation.
180
The Seventh Circuit then explained, "[a] claim for non-declaratory relief is 'independent' of the declaratory claim if: 1) it has its own federal subject-matter-jurisdictional basis, and 2) its viability is not wholly dependent upon the success of the declaratory claim."
181
Applying this test to this case, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the Wilton/Brillhart doctrine because "the non-declaratory claims are independent of the declaratory claim because they could stand alone in federal court-both jurisdictionally and substantively-irrespective of the declaratory claim."
182

C. The Third Approach: Brillhart/Wilton Applies if the Heart of the Complaint Seeks Declaratory Relief
The third approach to mixed-complaint cases is the "heart of the complaint" rule. Like the jurisdictional-independence rule, this approach 177. Id. at 715-16. This overview provides a useful and easy-to-follow guide (at least theoretically) for applying this approach. 184. Mamone distinguishes the approach of the Eighth Circuit, which he calls the "essence of the suit" rule, from the approach of various district courts, which he refers to as the "heart of the action" rule. Mamone, supra note 16, at 366-68. Given that these approaches seem indistinguishable apart from their language, they need not be categorized separately. Compare Royal Indem. Co While noting the discretion afforded by the Declaratory Judgment Act, the court held that "a court may still abstain in a case in which a party seeks damages as well as a declaratory judgment so long as the further necessary or proper relief would be based on the court's decree so that the essence of the suit remains a declaratory judgment action." 194 Applying this rule to Royal Indemnity's suit, the court reasoned that the claims for monetary damages could "all be characterized as 'further necessary and proper relief' that Royal Indemnity Company seeks based on the requested declaratory judgment."
195 Quoting and then parsing the language of the complaint's prayer for relief, the court determined that "[i]f the district court were to reject Royal Indemnity Company's claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act, [Royal Indemnity Company] could not recover on the claims for contribution, subrogation, unjust enrichment and equitable estoppel."
196 These claims for nondeclaratory relief were therefore simply the logical result of any declaratory relief, making the declaratory relief the "essence of this lawsuit." 197 
D. The Fourth Approach: Brillhart/Wilton Applies Always and Only to Claims for Declaratory Relief
This fourth and final approach is one that arguably the First Circuit has adopted, albeit this circuit has not expressly waded into the mixedcomplaint debate. 198 Rather, some courts 199 the heart of the complaint rule and staying the case because it was at its essence a claim for declaratory relief). The similarities between the jurisdictional-independence approach and the heart of the complaint rule should be immediately apparent. The Seventh Circuit stated that its approach was similar to the "heart of the complaint" rule "except that the jurisdictional independence of the non-declaratory claims does not appear to be a consideration [in the heart of the complaint rule]." R.R. 202 While their initial challenge to the statute was pending before the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the plaintiffs filed a § 1983 claim in federal court, seeking money damages, an injunction, and a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional. 203 The district court abstained from hearing the federal claims under Colorado River and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related state-law claims.
204
On appeal, the First Circuit decided to apply Younger abstention to the claims for nondeclaratory relief, to which the district court had applied Colorado River. 205 Then, the court briefly observed that the district court had not needed to have found the Colorado River test met to abstain on the declaratory judgment claim because Brillhart/Wilton applied there, meaning that the district court enjoyed broad discretion on whether to abstain. 206 The First Circuit never expressly described itself as resolving a mixed-complaint question, and in fact, the court appeared to have given no consideration to that issue. But from its unhesitating application of Brillhart/Wilton to a claim for declaratory relief after having applied a different abstention doctrine to the claims for nondeclaratory relief, courts have interpreted Rossi as adopting a disentanglement or "surgical" approach. 207 These four approaches represent fundamentally different approaches to determining whether to apply the Colorado River doctrine or the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine to mixed-complaint cases. Each approach has benefits; indeed, that is why federal courts of appeals have adopted each of these approaches. Yet, as the next Part explains, the approaches are not, like men, created equal.
208
III. UNMIXING THE MESS BY GETTING TO THE HEART OF THE COMPLAINT
The division among federal courts over how to handle abstention in mixed-complaint cases is obvious. How to resolve this division is, at least at first glance, less clear. On some level, each approach has intuitive appeal. But ultimately, the heart of the complaint rule is the best rule.
Reaching this conclusion requires developing criteria that appropriately weigh the strengths and weaknesses of each approach to mixed complaints within the context of America's judicial system. These criteria must account for the language of the statutes and judicial decisions that govern abstention and jurisdiction, consider the wise use of judicial resources, and permit courts to decide cases fairly. These concerns can be broken into four specific standards by which these approaches to mixed complaints can be measured: (1) preserving the discretionary language of the Declaratory Judgment Act while accounting for other jurisdictional statutes and the language of Colorado River; (2) promoting the wise use of judicial resources by ensuring that district courts have the necessary flexibility to manage their dockets wisely; (3) preventing plaintiffs from manipulating the judicial system by clever pleading; and (4) providing district courts the ability to reach the most just result given the particular facts of an individual case.
This Part examines these four standards, explaining why each is an appropriate tool by which to measure approaches to mixed complaints, how each of the four approaches stands up under the scrutiny of each standard, and ultimately why the heart of the complaint rule is the best approach to mixed complaints under these standards. Jan. 11, 2013) .
208. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . .").
A. Preserving the Discretion Provided by the Declaratory Judgment Act
First, whatever approach is adopted must preserve the discretion that Congress gave to federal courts in the Declaratory Judgment Act while accounting for other related statutes and judicial decisions. Because Congress specifically granted courts discretion in the Declaratory Judgment Act, any resolution of the mixed-complaint question must respect Congress's choice without undermining any other choice that Congress has made. 209 The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 210 This statutory language is "unique[]" in the discretion it grants to federal courts. 211 For example, federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
212 Similarly, diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 states that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions" that meet certain, well-known criteria. 213 Even statutes granting jurisdiction in more specific scenarios use similar language of "shall have original jurisdiction" to confer jurisdiction. 214 These different types of jurisdictional grants, when read in conjunction with Supreme Court decisions like Chief Justice Marshall's in Cohens, explain why courts have had to create abstention doctrines for cases brought under statutes like § 1331 or § 1332 but have been able to rely on the statutory language of § 2201 to refrain from deciding cases seeking declaratory relief. 215 Additionally, other statutes that use "may" do so to describe the 209. Cf. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2615 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Whatever one thinks of the policy decision Congress made, it was Congress' prerogative to make it."). court in which a plaintiff can file suit, not to describe what the court is allowed to do, making them fundamentally inapposite from § 2201. 216 The type of "may" in these other provisions has been interpreted as permitting a plaintiff to bring a claim in federal court or in state court. For instance, when analyzing whether state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 217 the Supreme Court reasoned that the statute "provides that suits of the kind described 'may' be brought in the federal district courts, not that they must be." 218 The Declaratory Judgment Act, by contrast, uses "may" in a way that gives courts latitude in whether to grant a certain type of relief.
These differences in the language of statutes are clear enough, but the question that flows from recognizing these differences is what effect those differences should have. In cases seeking only declaratory relief or only nondeclaratory relief, then the effect of the statutory language is obvious: Brillhart/Wilton applies to the claims for declaratory relief, and the appropriate judicially created abstention doctrine-such as Colorado River or Pullman-applies to the claims for nondeclaratory relief. Yet when a complaint seeks both types of relief, the challenge for a court is how to give effect to the language Congress has adopted in various sections of Title 28 of the U.S. Code. Giving effect to these grants is important because, as the Supreme Court recognized more than a century and half ago, Congress has the power to create inferior federal courts and to prescribe the scope of their jurisdiction. 219 Thus, whatever jurisdiction Congress grants, courts should-indeed, must, unless an abstention doctrine applies 220 -exercise as Congress granted. The heart of the complaint rule allows a court to exercise the discretion granted by Congress in § 2201 in a mixed-complaint case.
221
Under this rule, when a court determines that a complaint is, at its core, seeking declaratory relief, a court has the ability to decline to grant that relief. Because the claims for nondeclaratory relief are tangential to the real issue in the case, a court that decides not to decide the case is doing no harm to the jurisdictional provisions of § 1331 or § 1332. A case in federal court brought under either of those jurisdictional hooks would be heard (assuming Colorado River did not apply) if the case were really about those claims. But when the core issue of the case is about declaratory relief, tacked-on claims for nondeclaratory relief that do not get decided by a federal court should raise no serious concerns that a court is flouting its obligation to exercise jurisdiction. Indeed, the exceptions to the bright-line rule that the Fifth Circuit has adopted make this much clear. 222 Thus, the heart of the complaint rule respects these jurisdictional statutes, so courts' worries that the heart of the complaint rule "fails to give adequate consideration to Colorado River" are unfounded.
223
Of the remaining approaches, the rule that Brillhart/Wilton never applies to mixed complaints most obviously ignores the language of the Declaratory Judgment Act by taking away that discretion. It gives a court no opportunity to exercise the discretion over claims for declaratory relief that Congress granted. As one federal district court has observed, "[t]o eradicate that discretion simply because a coercive claim has been tacked onto what is, at its core, a declaratory judgment action would be . . . to marginalize Wilton, and to undermine the statutory 220. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821) ("[Federal courts] have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.").
221. See, e.g., Columbia Gas of Pa. v. Am. Int'l Grp., No. 10-1131, 2011 WL 294520, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2011) ("In a 'pure' diversity matter, divorced from any interrelated declaratory claims, I would cleave to that obligation. In a case such as this one, however, which implicates statutorily-granted discretion, other important principles are entitled to careful regard."); ITT Indus., Inc. v. Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 2d 552, 557 (E.D. Pa. 2006) ("To apply the Colorado River standard to actions containing both declaratory judgment and coercive claims without an analysis of the facts at hand would be to ignore the Supreme Court's specific recognition that declaratory judgment actions necessitate a different treatment than other types of cases."); Martha A. scheme established by Congress." 224 And as the Seventh Circuit said in rejecting this approach, "the mere fact that a litigant seeks some nonfrivolous, non-declaratory relief in addition to declaratory relief" should not obviate the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine. 225 Indeed, this bright-line approach appears so myopically concerned with courts' obligation to exercise their jurisdiction over claims for nondeclaratory relief absent the application of Colorado River that it ignores the equally legitimate discretion granted by Congress in § 2201.
226
The approach from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that Brillhart/Wilton applies only when claims for nondeclaratory relief are not jurisdictionally independent is only marginally better-although it preserves discretion in some cases, it removes discretion in other cases. Realistically, a court following the heart of the complaint rule and a court following the independent claim rule will likely reach similar conclusions, because if a case is truly about declaratory relief, then the claim for nondeclaratory relief is less likely to be independent, whereas a case that is about nondeclaratory relief at its core will likely have independent claims for that coercive relief. Still, even if the difference in these approaches likely has little practical effect, the theoretical difference matters because it reflects how courts view constitutional structure. Congress has the constitutional authority to create federal courts (other than the Supreme Court, of course 227 ) and to establish their jurisdiction and obligations to decide (or not to decide) cases, 228 so giving effect to Congress's decisions is essential for preserving the rule of law. 229 Finally, the First Circuit's approach that the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine applies only to claims for declaratory relief fully respects Congress's choices. In fact, it does the best job of respecting all of the jurisdictional statutes that Congress has adopted. It therefore does well under this 224. Lexington Ins. Co. v standard for evaluating approaches to mixed complaints. But this approach has other flaws that make it less desirable when evaluated under other standards.
B. Promoting Wise Judicial Administration
Judicial economy is constantly on the minds of federal judges.
230 As one court succinctly described the need for efficiently managing its docket: "Every day of trial this Court can save, even every hour of trial it can save in one case permits the Court to hear the claim of another litigant. This is of paramount importance and it is the essence of judicial economy."
231 Given the heavy caseload of federal courts and the time that it takes for cases to reach a resolution, 232 federal judges understandably focus on judicial economy. Any resolution of the circuit split over mixed complaints must therefore take into account the need for courts to manage their dockets efficiently.
233
The heart of the complaint rule promotes the wide judicial administration that is required for a well-functioning judiciary. ), courts need the ability "to avert wasteful, duplicative declaratory litigation on exclusively state law issues in federal court running alongside parallel state litigation on the same issues, with concomitant disruption to the time-honored values of federalism, comity and efficiency" when the complaint does not truly present a case that warrants adjudication in federal court.
237
By preserving a court's authority to look at the core of a complaint, the heart of the complaint protects this need.
238
None of the other approaches ensures that federal courts can manage their dockets as wisely as the heart of the complaint rule. First, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits' approach that forbids courts from applying the Brillhart/Wilton doctrine in mixed-complaint cases leaves little room for a court to consider judicial administration. Although judicial administration is central to the Colorado River analysis, 239 the scope of that analysis is narrow compared to Brillhart/Wilton. 240 Under this approach, if a plaintiff includes any claim seeking nondeclaratory relief in a complaint, the court cannot refrain from deciding the case, no matter the circumstance, unless Colorado 236. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) ("If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.").
237. River abstention applies. 241 Thus, no matter how duplicative the case, a federal judge must hear it except for the most limited of circumstancesthe judge cannot save a day or an hour to devote to other cases. 242 Ironically, this approach that elevates Colorado River undermines one of that doctrine's primary purposes. The Supreme Court based its decision in Colorado River on "wise judicial administration."
243
Brillhart/Wilton actually provides a court with far more flexibility to make decisions that promote such administration. Granted, the Court in Colorado River also emphasized the limited circumstances under which courts could decline to exercise jurisdiction. 244 But that concept is based on the idea that federal courts have been granted jurisdiction to decide certain types of cases and that courts have a duty to perform the tasks assigned to them. 245 When a case includes a claim for declaratory relief, Congress has expressly given courts broader leeway in deciding whether to decide the case, a point that the rigid approach that always requires the application of Colorado River ignores. 246 Of course, a mixed complaint also contains claims for nondeclaratory relief, for which courts have less discretion to abstain, which might favor the rule applying Brillhart/Wilton to claims for declaratory relief only. The heart of the complaint rule, however, does not undermine the "rule" that federal courts should exercise jurisdiction. 247 Rather, its application simply ensures that a plaintiff cannot cleverly plead his way into federal court by taking advantage of Colorado River.
248
Next, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits' approach that allows the application of Brillhart/Wilton only when claims for nondeclaratory relief are jurisdictionally independent guarantees too little discretion to 241 ensure that courts can wisely manage their dockets. Although in practice this test may function similarly to the heart of the complaint rule, again, the theoretical differences matter. Not applying Brillhart/Wilton simply because some claims for nondeclaratory relief have their own jurisdictional hook still leaves the hypothetical situation in which a court is left convinced that it should not decide a case but left with no choice but to decide it.
Finally, the First Circuit's approach that permits courts to apply Brillhart/Wilton only to claims for declaratory relief leaves a federal court in essentially the same position as the approach that says Brillhart/Wilton never applies to mixed-complaint cases. When the Brillhart/Wilton applies to claims for declaratory relief only, the federal court can apply the more lenient standard of that doctrine to some claims, but then it is left to apply Colorado River to the claims for nondeclaratory relief. Hence, unless those more stringent requirements were met, the court would still be forced to adjudicate a case that it otherwise believes should not be heard in federal court, but, with only Colorado River as a basis to abstain, it cannot do so.
C. Preventing Procedural Gamesmanship
Another important concern is the need to prevent procedural gamesmanship. Courts have repeatedly rejected litigants' attempts to manipulate the judicial system. 249 Indeed, "[n]o rational judicial system can tolerate manipulation." 250 Courts must have rules that they can enforce without litigants finding loopholes to avoid the result that a rule clearly contemplates. 251 Moreover, procedural gamesmanship opens the metaphorical door for duplicative litigation and conflicting judicial orders, which benefits no one but the manipulator (assuming the manipulator's plan works outs as expected) and only undermines the sound administration of justice. 252 This issue focuses on preventing litigants from pleading a case in such a way that a court is required to apply one abstention doctrine over another, simply because of how a case is pled instead of based on the merits of the case. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim." 253 The purpose of this notice pleading is to avoid the technical pleading formalities of bygone eras. 254 Consistent with this principle, litigants should not have to draft complaints that meet overly technical requirements to get a case heard in court. But at the same time, they should not be able to draft a complaint artfully (or craftily) to avoid unfavorable but should-be-applicable legal rules.
The heart of the complaint rule does the best job of preventing litigants from manipulating the judicial system. Under this rule, a court is not bound by the formalities of a pleading because the court can examine the complaint to determine what the real issue of the case is and what type of relief is central to the case. Thus, a plaintiff cannot insert a claim for nondeclaratory relief into a complaint to avoid Brillhart/Wilton and instead be subject to Colorado River. 255 The heart of the complaint rule therefore ensures that a court has the flexibility to apply whichever standard is appropriate in any given case.
Again, the approach of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits is particularly troublesome in this context. Although some of these courts have carved out an exception for "frivolous" claims for nondeclaratory relief, 256 this exception fails to address sufficiently the obvious problem with this approach: a plaintiff can simply "toss[]" in a claim for nondeclaratory relief and preclude the application of Brillhart/Wilton doctrine.
257 Finding a nonfrivolous claim should not be too challenging for most lawyers, particularly if the standard for "frivolous" in this context is akin to the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. 258 As one district court colorfully put it, "it would be the tail wagging the dog if the presence of a subordinate claim were sufficient to require a federal court to hear primary claims that it has determined are better resolved elsewhere." 259 This rule would "encourage abuses, as savvy litigants would recognize that creative pleading of tagalong coercive claims in tandem with declaratory judgment claims was a surefire means of circumventing Wilton and preserving a federal forum, notwithstanding parallel state proceedings." 260 If a court applied this approach, a litigant would not have to be particularly clever to work a claim for nondeclaratory relief into the complaint to avoid Brillhart/Wilton. Litigants would, in practice, find evading Brillhart/Wilton "far too easy." 261 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits' jurisdictional-independence approach, given its functional similarity to the heart of the complaint rule, should provide some limits on creative pleading. It requires a plaintiff to be able to state a claim for nondeclaratory relief over which a federal court would have jurisdiction independent of the claim for declaratory relief. But this approach is still "too inflexible." 262 Creative pleading is not that hard for even decent lawyers. Thus, although this approach is a step in the right direction, it ultimately falls short in fully preventing litigants from manipulative pleadings.
Lastly, the surgical approach of the First Circuit also fails to prevent a potential gamesmanship. Under this approach, a court could decide not to hear the claims for declaratory relief, but if the plaintiff included claims for nondeclaratory relief, then the court is left having to exercise jurisdiction over the case unless the court could abstain under Colorado River. Given the narrowness of Colorado River abstention, a court may be forced to exercise jurisdiction over the claims for nondeclaratory relief. If the court is required to hear the case, then a plaintiff may well have achieved whatever strategic advantage the plaintiff sought by filing a case in federal court, even if the claim for declaratory relief will not be decided. Thus, although all gamesmanship in this area typically involves multiple judicial systems, the gamesmanship to which this particular approach is subject is particularly problematic in this regard: this approach deals effectively with keeping a court from being forced to decide a claim for declaratory relief, but it does not keep a plaintiff from using a case in federal court as part of a larger plan, in conjunction with a case in a state court, to manipulate litigation (broadly defined) against a particular defendant.
D. Providing Flexibility to Reach a Just Result
A fourth consideration in determining how best to handle mixedcomplaint cases is the need to provide federal courts with the necessary flexibility to reach just results. Indeed, reaching a just result in each case is paramount. 263 Given the importance of reaching the correct result in each case, courts need an approach to mixed-complaint cases that does not unnecessarily hinder their ability to reach the result they determine is correct on the particular facts of a case.
The heart of the complaint rule guarantees this flexibility, which is one feature of it that has drawn many district courts to adopt it. 264 The heart of the complaint rule is a fact-driven approach that ensures a court can cut to the core of a complaint's allegations and apply the rule-either Brillhart/Wilton or Colorado River-that is more appropriate for the case. In other words, the court has the latitude to apply the doctrine that will reach whatever the court believes is the just result. This is not to suggest that a court will (or should) torture the analysis to reach the result that the court wants. 265 Instead, the idea is that the court has the flexibility to reach what should be the legally correct and just result. 264. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1237-38 ("One of the most desirable features of the 'heart of the action' rule is its flexibility, as it allows district courts to treat different cases differently based on the fundamental character of a particular action."); ITT Indus., Inc. v. Pac. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 2d 552, 557 (E.D. Pa. 2006) ("The Court finds that the considerations underlying the decisions in Colorado River and Wilton regarding a district court's obligation to exercise jurisdiction over an action are better served by the fact-driven 'heart of the matter' approach than the application of a bright-line rule.").
265. Cf. Lambert, supra note 229, at 1293-94 (discussing the view of law that sees no difference between law and political views).
266. Someone who devotedly follows this no-distinction view (which is essentially a version of legal realism, cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)) will reject the idea that a "legally correct" result exists. But this person should also believe that a Ultimately, federal judges must be trusted to apply the law faithfully; 267 otherwise, the entire federal judiciary would face far greater problems than whether courts were properly dealing with mixed-complaint cases.
Of course, too much flexibility can be a problem, either because the standards are too amorphous to be meaningful or because the standards are too difficult to apply. In the one other article addressing this topic, the proposed solution-applying a different approach based on the type of case, such as insurance litigation, securities litigation, or arbitrationrelated litigation 268 -suffers from this second problem. Having a different approach for each type of substantive claim not only would prove complicated in practice, as courts and litigants would have to keep straight these varying standards, 269 but also would require courts constantly to be addressing new types of cases to decide what approach applied to those claims. Moreover, this answer to the mixed-complaint question focuses solely on the underlying substance of a case, not the four systemic concerns that every mixed-complaint case raises and that are the basis of the analysis here.
This flexibility that the heart of the complaint rule provides does not, as the Fourth Circuit suggested, "deprive a plaintiff of access to a federal forum simply because he sought declaratory relief in addition to an injunction or money damages." 270 A court would only abstain, even under Brillhart/Wilton, if a moving party proved that abstention was appropriate. Brillhart/Wilton does not provide some trump card to keep a court from hearing a case that should be heard, which is what the Fourth Circuit, as well as the three other circuits sharing the Fourth Circuit's view, implied.
271
Ultimately, the heart of the complaint rule is neither amorphous nor complicated. It is simple to apply: a court examines a case to determine whether, at its core, the case is about declaratory or nondeclaratory relief, and then the court applies the appropriate abstention doctrine. Although court will reach its desired result no matter the legal rule, so the legal framework is presumably unimportant (or at least less important) to this person, which means this entire Article is something that person would see as nothing but a pointless academic exercise. 272 This room for disagreement does not make the heart of the complaint rule too mushy to apply meaningfully or too complicated to apply accurately.
As with the previous three standards for evaluating these approaches, the other approaches to mixed-complaint cases fall short. Starting with the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits' bright-line approach, a court has no flexibility: it must apply Colorado River. Thus, even if a court believed not exercising jurisdiction was the right answer, the court would be required to exercise jurisdiction unless the "stringent" standard of Colorado River is met. 273 This lack of flexibility suggests one of two outcomes when a court should not exercise jurisdiction over a mixedcomplaint case: either the court will faithfully apply Colorado River and exercise jurisdiction over the case despite any well-founded misgivings or the court will contort the Colorado River analysis to abstain. Neither result is desirable.
What this approach does offer, of course, is a clear rule. 274 Such bright-line approaches are certainly beneficial in some respects. 275 For example, they "foster consistency throughout the courts and because they alert parties to what is allowed and what is not in the eyes of the law." 276 Although bright-line rules are often preferable because they provide more predictability for courts and litigants, 277 bright-line rules can also lead to more unpalatable results, 278 particularly in issues that can be as fact-intensive as mixed-complaint cases. Given the fact-intensive nature of a mixed-complaint case and the fact that these cases, while important,
do not yet threaten to overwhelm federal courts' dockets, providing flexibility for courts to get the answer right outweighs the benefits of a bright-line rule in this particular situation.
Next, as for the Seventh and Ninth Circuit's approach, it provides flexibility only when claims for nondeclaratory relief have no independent jurisdictional basis. Given the potential for creative pleading, 279 this standard could leave courts often facing a situation in which a plaintiff has found a jurisdictional hook for a claim for nondeclaratory relief, leaving the court unable to apply Brillhart/Wilton and unable to abstain under Colorado River, despite having the firm conviction that not deciding the case is the better option. 280 And finally, as for the First Circuit's approach, this rule gives a court flexibility to deal with the claim for declaratory relief, but it still leaves a court having to apply Colorado River when evaluating the claims for nondeclaratory relief. Of course, those claims are premised on jurisdictional statutes 281 that do not provide the flexibility of 28 U.S.C. § 2201, but when concerns about procedural gamesmanship are frequently at the center of a court's thinking, 282 being left to apply Colorado River may still allow a litigant to keep a case in federal court when practical considerations suggest that is not the proper outcome.
CONCLUSION
Each of these four approaches to mixed complaints has some rationale foundation. Each has some benefits. Each has some drawbacks. But ultimately, the heart of the complaint approach "is the most appropriate and the most readily reconcilable with applicable legal principles."
283 Given the array of concerns facing courts, this approach best strikes the balance of preserving the unique language that Congress used in § 2201, promoting the wise use of judicial resources, preventing manipulation of litigation, and providing courts the needed flexibility for reaching the correct result. As instances of mixed complaints are likely to rise as judicial caseloads get larger, courts must have a rule that allows them to deal with these cases fairly and efficiently. The heart of the complaint approach is that rule.
